Saturday, March 6, 2010

A Socratic Dialogue on Art and Beauty - By Trevor Coffrin

[The following is a Socratic dialogue I have written to help get at the meaning of the word beauty. All characters are fictional, except of couse, for Socrates]. Atreus is the director of the Art Gallery of Athens, and has to determine which of two paintings will be displayed in the main foyer of the gallery during the grand opening next week. Unfortunately, the foyer can only accommodate one of the paintings, and since it will be this painting that will receive the most attention and make the strongest impression with the gallery visitors, Atreus wants to ensure he places the more beautiful of the two paintings there. Finally Atreus decides which of the two paintings is more beautiful and hangs it in the foyer.

The next day, Atreus spots his old friend Socrates walking by the gallery, and asks Socrates what he thinks of the painting in the main foyer. Socrates exclaims that the painting is exquisite. Atreus then goes on to tell Socrates of the difficulty he had in trying to decide which of two paintings was to be hung in the foyer. Atreus explains that after much difficulty, he finally determined which of the two paintings was more beautiful. Upon hearing this, Socrates has the following conversation with Atreus.

SOCRATES: Atreus, I envy you greatly. If I was curator of this gallery, I would have spent a lifetime deciding which of two paintings were more beautiful, yet it only took you a single day.

ATREUS: Surely Socrates you do not give yourself enough credit. You are one of Athens most intellectually gifted citizens. You would have no difficulty in determining which of two things were more beautiful.

SOCRATES: No Atreus, you give me too much credit. I would never be so foolish as to claim that I could determine which of two things were more beautiful, for I do not even know what beauty is.

ATREUS: Surely you must know what beauty is. The notion of beauty comes so naturally to us that to claim not to know is simply foolish. Even a child knows what beauty is. Are you just putting me on, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Not at all Atreus, I am only asking what beauty is out of complete and utter sincerity. Please won’t you lend me a moment of your precious time and impart on me your knowledge in this particular area?

ATREUS: Very well Socrates. Beauty is that which we find physically attractive, things that are pretty, things that look good, are pleasant to look at, pleasing to the eye and so forth. Surely you would agree?

SOCRATES: So Atreus, beauty is simply that which pleases the eye?

ATREUS: Of course, Socrates. It is as simple as that. You see, the notion of beauty is not a difficult concept to grasp; you understand it already.

SOCRATES: My dear Atreus, I am troubled by one thing. What are we to make of music that people speak of as beautiful? Are we to say that they are mistaken in their thinking and that only that which is physically appealing is beautiful?

ATREUS: No, Socrates, of course not, music too can be beautiful.

SOCRATES: But I thought beauty was that which is pretty, pleasing to the eye, things that look good, etc. Are you now saying that your definition of beauty was inadequate? If so Atreus, please try again to tell me what beauty is and be as exact as you can in your explanation this time.

ATREUS: We will simply adjust our definition of beauty to include those things that also sound beautiful. Will that do?

SOCRATES: I am not sure, Atreus. We’ll have to investigate this new definition further to see if our understanding of beauty is adequate. Let me ask you this Atreus, is our dear old friend Cronus beautiful? (Here I imagine the fictional character Chronus to be a withered unattractive old man).

ATREUS: Surely Socrates, most would not think so. Cronus is of such an old age that any beauty that once was with him has now left.

SOCRATES: But Atreus, our friend Cronus has given all his wealth to charity, has worked a lifetime as a volunteer, and is widely considered a virtuous person by all who have met him. Would it be wrong to say that Cronus’ character has moral beauty?

ATREUS: No, I suppose it would not be wrong to say that Socrates. I would agree that Cronus’ character is morally beautiful.

SOCRATES: Therefore I am left to conclude that beauty is not only that which is appealing visually and audibly, but there can also be beauty in character, is this correct Atreus?

ATREUS: Yes this is so Socrates.

SOCRATES: And what is it about Cronus’ moral character that makes him beautiful?

ATREUS: Cronus’ moral character is considered beautiful because the acts he performs are morally praiseworthy; his acts are good acts.

SOCRATES: Ah, so am I to understand that beauty must express good in order to be beautiful?

ATREUS: Yes Socrates, that is right. What has beauty must express good.

SOCRATES: Good Atreus, you are doing better. I feel we are getting closer to understanding what beauty is. Now, is beauty a part of good, or is good a part of beauty? Or do both terms have identical meaning?

ATREUS: I am afraid I don’t understand the question Socrates.

SOCRATES: Is all that is beautiful good, or is all that is good beautiful?

ATREUS: All that is beautiful is good.

SOCRATES: Yes, but what about the second part of the question, Atreus? Is all that is good beautiful?

ATREUS: No, Socrates. All that is good is not beautiful. For example, we might say that Pythagoras is good at math, but it would be inaccurate to say that Pythagoras is beautiful at math. So good and beauty are not interchangeable terms.

SOCRATES: Very good Atreus. So we shall say that beauty must be good in order to be rightfully considered beauty. But let me ask you this Atreus. Do you consider plays to be beautiful?

ATREUS: Of course Socrates, there is great beauty in plays. A play is a work of art. A play is a beautiful thing, it expresses raw human emotion, it teaches, it entertains, etc.

SOCRATES: And what about the play Orecleia, Atreus? Have you seen it? (This is a fictional play created for this dialogue)

ATREUS: Yes Socrates, I have seen it. It is a beautiful play, with all of its elegant costumes, poetic dialogue, and so on. Orecleia is a true work of art.

SOCRATES: But Atreus, the central message in Orecleia is terribly immoral; it is about cheating, stealing, and lying. Its main characters are completely immoral too. Are we to still say that it is beautiful even though it contains much that is not good?

ATREUS: Of course Orecleia is still a beautiful play, Socrates, even with all the immoral elements.

SOCRATES: But why, Atreus? We have already said that that which is beautiful must be good, yet Orecleia has much that is bad. Are we to now say that beauty can express something bad and still be beautiful?

ATREUS: Yes, it looks that way Socrates. I am not prepared to say that Orecleia is not beautiful just because it contains bad; I maintain that it is a beautiful play. Therefore, I am left to conclude that beauty can contain bad and still be beautiful.

SOCRATES: Lets not be too hasty now in our conclusions Atreus. Maybe people find the play beautiful in spite of the fact that it contains some bad? In other words, maybe the play is beautiful because it contains more good than bad?

ATREUS: By Zeus, Socrates, that’s it. Beauty can still be found in that which contains some bad, as long as there is more good overall than bad.

SOCRATES: So do the people only like the morally good parts of the play? That is, do they only find beauty in the parts of the play that have a good moral message?

ATREUS: No, people enjoy the immoral aspects of the play too. People enjoy the conniving characters who cheat, lie, steal, etc. These characters do not detract from the beauty of the play; in fact, I think they add to its beauty. These unsavoury characters serve to make the play more interesting and more realistic; true to life.

SOCRATES: Do you not see what you have done just now, Atreus? You have admitted that people find beauty in badness too. Therefore, how can we hold that beauty must express good in order to be beautiful?

ATREUS: I don’t know Socrates. I just know beauty when I see it. I sometimes find that which is bad beautiful, sometimes that which is good beautiful. Beauty is up to the person judging it.

SOCRATES: I see Atreus. Perhaps this new revelation will lead us to the answer of what beauty is. If beauty is up to the person judging it, then can everything be beautiful? Can even the most disgusting of creatures, the most mournful music, and the most conniving character be beautiful?

ATREUS: No Socrates, of course not. There are limits as to what can be beautiful.

SOCRATES: Great Atreus. We are now on the brink of discovering what beauty is. Tell me what the limits are to beauty. For surely where the limits of beauty are to be found, we will find the true essence of beauty.

ATREUS: Please Socrates, I have grown weary upon this endless questioning. I am not able to describe the limits of beauty. I will give one last attempt at defining beauty. See this flower that grows here? This flower is beautiful.

SOCRATES: In virtue of what is this flower beautiful?

ATREUS: This flower is beautiful in virtue of the way it makes me feel. This flower instils in me a feeling of beauty.

SOCRATES: So beauty is a feeling?

ATREUS: Beauty is that which one feels when one is looking at something appealing, or pleasing to the senses, such as this flower.

SOCRATES: So beauty is that which one feels when sensing something appealing. But appealing is the word you used to describe beauty. Therefore, your claim would be that beauty is that which one feels when one is looking at something beautiful. My dear Atreus, you have not given me any clearer picture of what beauty is than what I already had before I came here. I feel that if we spend just a few hours longer, we will be able to determine just what beauty is, Atreus. Won’t you stay and enlighten an old fool?

ATREUS: Please Socrates, I must go. I have just remembered some final preparations for the gallery that I need to do right away. Goodbye Socrates.

What I have intended to show here is an example of a Socratic dialogue. Like most other dialogues, Socrates, or one of his friends is confronted with a dilemma of a philosophical nature. At the heart of this dilemma is the true meaning of the term “beauty.” In this dialogue, Socrates claims to have no clear notion about what beauty is, yet his interlocutor, Atreus is considered somewhat of an expert in this area. Atreus, feeling confident he knows what beauty is, gives in to Socrates’ plea to define the term. In Atreus’ attempt to define beauty, Socrates finds problems with each definition.

The philosophical aim of this dialogue was to demonstrate that Atreus’ understanding of beauty was inadequate. Continually Atreus has to expand his definition of beauty in order to please Socrates. The end goal was to get Atreus to contradict himself. Just when Atreus feels as though he has given a thorough, all-encompassing definition of beauty, he ends up contradicting himself. He says that all that is beautiful must be good, but then he is forced to admit that there is beauty in what is bad too. Finally Atreus gives one last attempt at defining the term, but this too, is not good enough for Socrates.

Thursday, March 4, 2010

SYSTEMS SENSITIVE DIALOGUE INTERVENTION - by Sebastian Slotte

Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland
P.O.Box 1100, FIN-02015 HUT, Finland
Email: sebastian.slotte@hut.fi
Tel. +358 50 376 1967
Fax +358 9 451 3096

Abstract

The paper presents a general methodology for dialogue interventions, Systems
Sensitive Dialogue Intervention Dialogue interventions are viewed in the light of Gerald
Midgleys general presentation of systemic intervention. By focusing on the dialogue
philosophy of Martin Buber and the key elements in two popular dialogue methods it is
proposed that a) enhancing individual participants sensitivity to the unique human system
they form is the primary task of a dialogue intervention, b) when designing dialogical
interventions it is useful to creatively use elements from different available dialogical
methods and c) dialogue interventions should be designed in experiential and existential
rather than in metaphysical terms.

Keywords: dialogue, systemic intervention, methodology

INTRODUCTION

Dialogue methods consist of specific rules and guidelines that aim to improve group
interaction, collective learning and investigation. The central task of a dialogue is to provide
a setting for communication and thinking in a group. Normally, the guidelines and rules for
everyday debates, discussions and meetings are tacit. Of course, tacit rules vary from
organization to organization and from culture to culture, and it is contingent which rules are
applied. In dialogue interventions these rules and guidelines are made explicit.

Over the past ten years, dialogue has made a breakthrough in a number of fields.
Dialogue has been recommended by organizational theoreticians and introduced in
organizations for various purposes. The systems thinking variant of the learning organization
(Senge, 1990; Senge et al., 1994), the knowledge creating company (Nonaka and Takeuchi,
1995) and the notion of corporate culture (Schein, 1999) are examples of general
organizational theories which regard dialogue as a central organizational practice. Dialogue
and dialogical methods are presented as a core practice of specific organizational areas such
as team learning (Senge, 1990; Senge et al., 1994), leadership programs (Frydman et al.,
2000), corporate responsibility and human rights (Frankental et al., 2000) and Business
Ethics (Maclagan, 2000; van Hooft 2000).

Moreover, dialogue has been implemented in participatory planning(Väntänen et. al,
2003) community building (Freire, 1972), and in national and international conflict
resolution (Deutsch and Coleman, 2000; Susskind et al., 1999). Educational dialogue has
been presented as an alternative to traditional teacher and fact centered education (Norris,
2003). Moreover, general recipes for dialogical interventions and consultancy have been put
forth by theoreticians and practitioners alike (Ellinor and Gerard 1998; Flick, 1998; Isaacs,
1999; Simmons, 1999; Yankelovich, 1999).

The effort of this paper is to contribute to the development of a methodology for
Dialogue Interventions called Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention. In accordance
with Midgleys (2000) theory of systemic intervention, it is proposed that a methodology
is an important aid for practitioners and researchers in designing proper and effective
dialogue interventions.

A proper dialogue intervention is defined as aiming at enhancing participants’
sensitivity to the human system they form together. This sensitivity to the relational,
inquiring, and synergetic is constitutive to dialogue. An effective dialogue intervention
produces through appropriate dialogue produces a desirable outcome e.g. improvement,
from the whole systems viewpoint.

The notion of Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention is a result of empirical
experimentation with various dialogue methods and combinations. The interventions
where carried out in various fields such as education (Hjelm and Slotte, 2001; Slotte and
Hjelm, 2002; Slotte 2003), decision making (Slotte and Hämäläinen, 2003), and natural
resources conflict management (Väntänen et al., 2003).

The research is related to a multidisciplinary research project on Systems
Intelligence (Hämäläinen and Saarinen, 2004) of which dialogue is an integral part.
The presentation of Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention is organized in the
following way. Firstly, dialogue interventions are discussed in the light of Midgely’s
(2000) theory of Systemic Intervention. Secondly, reservations against the benefits of
dialogue are discussed with references to Stacey (2001). Systems Sensitive Dialogue
Interventions are presented as enhancing systems sensitivity in participants, resting on a
creative use of methods and avoiding normative metaphysical demands.

METHODOLOGY

Recently, there have been some disputes about which methods create proper and
efficient dialogue an are the most accurate (Kessels, 2001; Platts, 2002). The claim
made here is that such discussions become obsolate if one takes the human system and
its particular needs as a starting point for dialogue interventions. Rather than asking
which method is the correct one, the practitioner should consider what he can do and
which actions and methods in any particular situation create proper dialogue e.g. an
atmosphere of joint investigation, thinking together, inquiry, reflection and respect
(Boele, 1997; Bohm, 1996; Buber, 1947) in a human system, such as a team, a class, a
family, a group of stakeholders, a management team etc. The laws of social behavior are
not as rigid as the laws of mechanism and nature. The same method is likely to produce
different outcomes in different settings. Accordingly, we cannot expect that one method
will produce proper dialogue in every situation. Rather, proper dialogue is reached
through a creative use of different methods.

According to Midgley (2000), a methodology for systemic intervention should
take action for improvement as an explicit starting point. Improvement is defined
temporarily and locally as different human systems and agents may use different
boundary judgments (Midgley, 2000). In Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention,
improvement is viewed through the realization of the desired consequences of the
human system engaged in dialogue. The goals of the different dialogue methods
include, for example, the clarification of a concept, conflict resolution and improved
joint investigation. When a particular aim is realized it represents improvement, if the
system engaged in dialogue judges so.

Thus, the methods to facilitate dialogue interventions should not be regarded as
static but flexible and should be chosen in compliance with the expectations, needs,
fears, values and maturity of the individuals participating, and with the human system
they together create.

Finally, it is proposed that not only the facilitator of a dialogue intervention
should be open about his normative vision (Midgley, 2001; Midgley and Ochoa-Arias,
1999) but not impose it.The that participants engaged in a dialogue intervention should
be encouraged to reflect on ideological, metaphysical and pragmatic boundaries
(Midgley, 2001).

CHALLENGES

In recent criticism the impact of dialogue has been questioned. A powerful
argument against dialogue as presented by Senge and Bohm is made by Stacey (2001).
Stacey makes a strong case about learning and knowledge creation in organizations and
argues that dialogue is an attempt to return to the ancient wisdom and conversational
patterns of old cultures, such as those of North American Indians. Stacey rebukes this
attempt as a nonsensical romantic idea of a lost Eden.

However, the references to Native Americans should be regarded as a
pedagogical way of illustrating alternatives to aggressive debate, advocacy and
dialectics. The rise of the principles and the practice of dialogue is, in fact, a highly
modern phenomenon with purely European roots (Taylor, 1989; Walker,1999). Of
course, dialogue was a central way to engage in theoretical matters with practical
implications in the days of Socrates (Zanakis et al., 2003) and during the Hellenistic era
of philosophy, the practice of dialogical skills, such as listening and presence became a
central skill in the philosophical quest for a good life (Hadot, 1995). But not before the
first half of the 20th century did philosophers, such as Leonard Nelson, Martin Buber,
and Mikhail Bakhtin formulate the basic ideas of dialogue as a practice that all men and
women can and should engage in (Bradbury and Lichtenstein 2000). It is these
philosophies of dialogue that organizational practitioners, theoreticians, educationalists
and consultants today, indirectly or directly, are building on in real world interventions.
In opposition to Bohm’s and Senge’s dialogue conception, Stacey (2001) wants to
draw attention to the multitude of everyday conversations that can be very creative but also
very destructive. Moreover, Stacey claims that organizational theoreticians and consultants,
instead of presenting dialogue and other conversational tools of an idealized kind, should
focus on understanding the communicative interaction we currently engage in within
hierarchical organizations. The answer to Stacey on this point is that there is extensive
evidence suggesting that ordinary communication and the thinking that accompanies it often
goes wrong in ways that may have negative, sometimes fatal, impact on a wide variety of
organizational aspects: failure of organizational change programs, failure of strategic
programs, and collapse of internal and external ethics (Dalla Costa, 1999; De Geuss, 1999;
Senge et al., 1999). It is widely accepted that ordinary communication and thinking can, and
at times should, be the object of change (Huczynski and Buchanan, 2001; Janis, 1982). Far
from being an idealization, dialogue takes into account ordinary ways of communication and
can, in the form of dialogue sessions, be a complement to these. The lessons and skills
learned in dialogue session can also be transformed and incorporated into other more
ordinary forms of communication and interaction (Slotte, 2004).

According to Stacey (2001), dialogue assumes a distinction between the
individual and the collective mind. Stacey argues that the individual and the group are
the same phenomenon and that there is no transcendent whole, or group mind, or
common pool of meaning outside of it. Rather, common meaning emerges in the
communicative interaction between people in their local situation in the present (Stacey,
2001). However, dialogue is fundamentally not resting on such an ontological split, but
rather in line with the view Stacey holds on this particular issue. Bohm whose ideas
about dialogue the argument is directed against, clearly states (Bohm 1992; Bohm 1996)
that individual thinking is dependent on cultural structures of thought and that
individual thinking has an impact on the common structure and content of thought in a
given culture. In fact, dialogue rest on the idea that individual thoughts and collective
thought are not separate but necessarily affecting each other. Dialogue is rather in line
with constructivism (Gergen et al., 2002). However, Stacey must be credited for his
indirect criticism of attempts to present dialogue as resting more or less on mysticism
and as a strive for predetermined metaphysical insights. I will return to this point in the
next to last section of the paper.

SYSTEMS FOCUS

Common for the different conceptions and methods of dialogue is the attempt to
overcome individual and social barriers for sharing meaning, values and understanding.
Dialogue has proven to be a powerful way of intervening, for example, in situations
were threats to joint investigation, mutual respect and meaningful communication such
as groupthink ,(Janis, 1982) defensive and limiting interpersonal reasoning are strong
(Kahneman et al., 1982).

Martin Buber’s (1947) philosophy of dialogue paves the way towards seeing a
group of dialoguers as a special kind of human system. Buber’s views on dialogue have
been applied in counseling and to some extent in conflict situations (Schuster, 1999) but
when it comes to dialogue interventions in larger human systems, such as as
organizations, his views on dialogue and especially his view of relationality have
remained somewhat in the shadow (Bradbury H and Lichtenstein B, 2000). For
example, Dixon (1998), Flick (1998) Isaacs (1999), Senge (1990) and Yankelovich
(1999) all mention Buber as an important figure. However, they do not explicitly apply
dialogue with reference to his discussion on applied dialogue (Buber, 1947). Though
Buber did not envision a dialogue method, he claimed that the necessary conditions for
dialogue to emerge as a practice are the recognition of relationality, trust, the idea of
communication with and responsibility (Buber 1947).

According to Buber (1947) engagement in dialogue must be promoted by
pointing to the relational character of human systems. The importance of the relational
aspects of dialogue cannot be emphasized enough. First and foremost dialogue becomes
a way to relate with the other participants partaking in the dialogue. The challenge of
the participants in dialogue is to recognize the uniqueness of the particular human
systems they comprise. It is through the notion of this engagement that the dialogical
skills such as listening, suspension, respecting and voicing (Isaacs, 1999) gain their
meaning.

The entrance to dialogue is the realization that man is a relational creature that
has the possibility to meet, communicate and create in a “space between”. The
relationality and the “space between” is not just something one might choose or wish to
engage in. According to Buber (1947) it exists independently of any particular action
between human beings. The “space between” is not observable in space and time in the
same sense that a single individual and a collective are. For example, changes in a
person, such as aging, can be seen when observing that person for some time. Likewise,
a collective and its changes can be observed in space and time. However, the “space
between” is not observable in similar fashion. It is something re-constituted in every
accidental encounter between two persons (Buber 1947).

Engagement in dialogue is to fully engage oneself with the other. Dialogue is not
primarly a detached presentation of ones ideas and a detached inquiry into the ideas of
others. Dialogue is not communication about but communication with (Buber, 1947). It
is not plainly aimed at exchanging views between contributors from to different
perspectives or human systems. The focus of a dialogue intervention should primary be
on the values, knowledge and ideas within the system currently engaged in dialogue, not
on the values, knowledge and ideas of the individuals or the system they represent. To
engage in dialogue does not necessarily mean giving up ones own point of view or fully
accepting that of the other. Buber statets that the individual sphere is untouched, but
when people enter into dialogue the law of individual points no longer holds (Buber
1947). Thus, for Buber the ontology of the dialogical, e.g. the reality and nature of
dialogue is systemic in the systems thinking sense of the word: human systems in
dialogue develop and create something new out of what the participating individual
values, ideas and knowledge bring with them. In dialogue, participants set aside the
belief that thoughts or ideas can only be communicated from an individual to another, or
that rules and forces external to these two individuals determine what is spoken. The
space between can be characterized as a form of common reason where multiple voices
create and work on single ideas.

The idea of the relational character of communication differs strongly from the
so called conduit metaphor which is the dominant view of communication, for example,
in the lion part of managerial textbooks (Bokeno, 2002; Axley, 1984). According to the
conduit metaphor, successful communication is like a pipeline. Messages are
understood as information that are transmitted from a sender to a receiver, decoded by
the receiver, and successful if the meaning of the message is the same at both ends
(Bokeno 2002). According to Bokeno the conduit metaphor which describes how the
understanding and practice of communication is perceived in organizations, is
theoretically inappropriate, often dysfunctional and ineffective and a hindrance for
implementing programs for creative, playfull and innovative communication such as
dialogue. If the conduit concept is dominating and not questioned, dialogic modes of
interaction are in danger of being covered as yet another management concept, rather
than modeled or developed as the rich, constructive and productive mode of interaction
that it is (Bokeno 2002).

An example of why a dialogue intervention might fail due to the mistake of
viewing dialogue as conduit communication is found in the practice what is called
cross-cultural dialogue (Du Bois and Hutson, 1997). Cross-cultural dialogue has
recently been criticized for encouraging such knowledge of other participants that is
considered inappropriate (Jones 1999). In a cross-cultural dialogue where white and
black students were participating in order to exchange information about their own
culture the demands by white students to know marginalized black students enforced
colonizing attitudes and strengthened prejudices. According to Jones (1999), emphatic
knowing in cross-cultural dialogue can thus prevent us from recognizing our own
systematic complicity.

From the viewpoint presented here, cross-cultural dialogue is not dialogical
because its reliance upon the conduit metaphor prevents participants in dialogue to
perceive each other as forming a unique human system. In a dialogue situation
participants practice and focus on the virtues of dialogue, pay attention to their own
habits of thought, mental models and possible prejudices. Especially dialogue that aims
at mediating in conflicts between participants should aid understanding and respect for
their counterparts by encouraging to meet the person behind the system or position they
represent. Engagement in group dialogue leaves personal integrity intact but allows for
surprise and unpredictable innovations in the interplay between dialoguers. According
to Buber, a criteria for dialogue is that participants have the intention of establishing
mutual relations (Buber 1947).

Naturally, participants in a dialogue also have obligations and commitments to
other systems and goals. The point emphasized here is that dialogue is especially well
suited for understanding and working with the human system one is temporarily
engaged with. When a dialogical relationship is established, it can well serve as a basis
for discussing and reflecting on commitments to other human systems.

MIXING METHODS

The systems emphasis in Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention bears
consequences on method. The proposal here is that the starting point of a dialogue
intervention should not be one given method and its utilizations for a given purpose but
rather the needs and challenges of the human system that is to be engaged in dialogue.
The human system comes first, then method. This is not to say that methods are
superfluous. However, the design and facilitation of dialogue is situational. Methods
chosen should correspond to the motivation and maturity of the participants of dialogue.
In the following I shall briefly present two popular dialogue methods, Bohmian
and Nelsonian dialogue in order to show that both, despite their differences, have
strengths and can be used in dialogue interventions.

The Bohmian Method

According to the Bohmian School of dialogue, the focus in dialogue should be
on process rather than on content. A dialogue should not have a predetermined agenda
or a given content (Isaacs 1999; Senge, 1994; Simmons, 1999). By paying attention to
the guidelines or virtues of dialogue, the agenda or issues are said to emerge during the
dialogue process itself (Bohm, 1992; Bohm, 1996). Isaacs (1999) discusses four
principal virtues of dialogue: listening, suspension of judgment, expressing and
respecting. The virtues are not simply presented as virtues that one can automatically
turn to but rather as skills that one should develop and learn to practice. Other important
virtues or skills presented by Isaac and other theoreticians and practitioners include
thinking together, encouraging others to speak, focusing on the issue and not on the
personal character of other participants, winning together rather than winning for
yourself, speaking from experience, and changing the viewpoint.

The reason to engage in dialogue is, for Bohm and others who share his views
on dialogue, a practical matter. Dialogue creates shared meaning, values and a sense of
community that supports joint action and the creation of culture (Bohm 1992). By
making dialogue one of the core principles of an organization or a community a new
communication and thinking culture can emerge. Isaacs (1999) and Senge (1994)
provide a lot of examples of this. For Senge et al. (1994) dialogue becomes a way to
align action. According to Senge (1990), Bohmian type of dialogue gives access to such
information and meaning that cannot be accessed individually, enhances new action,
provides individuals with collective meaning and offers a place for innovation and
inquiry. Furthermore, all these capabilities are thought to improve efficiency in groups
and in organizations.

The Socratic Method

Leonard Nelson (1956) developed the Socratic Method. Today it is chiefly
known as Socratic Dialogue or Neo-Socratic Dialogue. Socratic Dialogue is a way to
engage people in an advanced philosophical dialogue. The method should naturally not
be confused with the Socratic dialogues of Plato even if it is inspired by Socrates
(Boele, 1997). Participation in a Socratic dialogue does not require prior experience in
philosophy but an interest to discuss philosophical and ethical questions and a
willingness to distance oneself from one’s own commitments (Boele, 1998; Van Hooft,
2000). In organizational contexts, Socratic dialogue has become especially popular in
developing and investigating values and business ethics (Bolten 2001, Kessels 2001,
Van Hooft 2000). In contrast to the idea that dialogue is rather process than content
Socratic dialogue stands out by always focusing on a predetermined topic or question.
The core of Socratic Dialogue is called “regressive abstraction”. Regressive
abstraction is an inquiry into the everyday experiences of participants and their
understanding of these experiences by comparing, analyzing and seeing them in the
light of the general concepts they are founded on. For example, a concrete experience
conceptualized and described as an instance of freedom is contrasted with a general
definition of freedom. Both the concrete experience and the abstraction are developed in
the course of the dialogue by the dialoguers themselves.

A Socratic Dialogue starts with a question of investigation, for instance: “What
is meaningful work?”, “What is freedom?”, or “What is love?”. The dialogue starts with
all participants giving a personal example of a situation were they feel that an instance
of the matter of investigation was realized. The participants, when presenting their
examples, do not have to prove that their examples are an instance of the matter of
investigation. Intuition or feeling is enough. The example should be one in which the
participant herself is a main character. Also, the example should be concrete in space
and time. For example; “Two weeks ago on Sunday, when visiting a friend of mine the
following happened”. The dialogue proceeds by discussing which one of the examples
should be chosen as a core example of the investigation. After choosing one example
the dialogue gradually reaches an increasingly abstract level culminating in a core
definition: E.g. “freedom is X” were X stands for a sentence of attributes suggested and
dialogued about amongst the participants. Thereafter the dialogue proceeds back to the
concrete by analyzing the abstract judgments principles and rules and ending at the
question about its applicability in concrete life.

Content and Process

For a general methodology of dialogue in Systemic interventions, both the
Bohmian and Nelsonian methods are important. Systems Sensitive Dialogue
Intervention takes into consideration both content and process. Dialogue intervention
can focus solely on content but often such dialogues does not have an impact on the way
people interact. It does not provide dialoguers with a new ability for interaction e.g.
systems sensitivity. The merits of Socratic Dialogue in a Systemic Intervention is that it
provides a structured way to engage in dialogue about a given issue and that dialoguers
find perspectives on the issue from personal experience, thus avoiding speculation and
possible power differences due to, for example, educational level or position.

When the choice of method is based on the needs of the human system engaging
in dialogue, a combination of methods can be useful. For instance, a conflict situation
might require that participants improve their listening skills, are encouraged to show
respect for other stakeholders, and learn to thinking together. However, to engage in a
dialogue with no agenda can easily grow into a feeling that it is a waste time especially
if it is a conflict situation and in times of pressing problems (Frydman et al., 2000;
Slotte and Hämäläinen 2004 ).

Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention emphasizes creative design of dialogue
interventions. This has, for example been done in a natural resources decision making
context (Slotte and Hämäläinen 2003) where the reflection on boundaries as an
improvement itself became important. The creative mix of dialogue methods can also be
strengthened by other dialogue-related methods such as Appreciative Inquiry
(Copperrider and Whitney 1999; Norum 2003) and Communication Other/Wise
(Bokeno 2002).

FROM METAPHYSICS TO EXPERIENCE

Commitment to any particular metaphysics of dialogue is not a necessary
precondition for engaging in dialogue. In a Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention, the
facilitator refraims from advancing any metaphysical agenda of her own. Midgley (2000)
points out and questions the fact that some people in the Community OR research
community have included political agendas in their interventions. What applies to political
agendas in Midgleys analysis applies to metaphysics in dialogue interventions . Bohmian
dialogue, Socratic dialogue and Bubers presentation of dialogue include metaphysical claims
such as ”the unfolding of thought”, ”the implicate order” ”the self-confidence of reason” and
”unity with God”. Ethically, practitioners and theoreticians are in their full right to ascribe
metaphysical characteristic to dialogue but these meta-level descriptions should not inform a
dialogue intervention. When the applicative literature presents the metaphysical hypotheses
and metaphors of the philosophies of dialogue as hard facts of dialogue, dialogue runs the
risk of becoming a quest for these metaphysical and metaphorical states and thus perceived
by participants as a mystic procedure were the ultimate goal is to experience a metaphysical
state such as the implicate order, collective intelligence, the one, God or the Platonic world
of ideas.

For example, if dialogue is defined as a quest for the platonic ideas or unity with
God, it would be difficult and ethically questionable to engage a relativist respectively
an atheist in the dialogue. Participants in a dialogue should be given the sole right to
draw their own metaphysical conclusion about the dialogue. Systems sensitivity does
not involve, preclude or exclude any predetermined metaphysics but concerns
observable relational aspects. In other words, it is proposed that the classification of the
metaphysical nature of these experiences should be left to the dialoguers themselves.
A Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention assumes that imposing any
metaphysical ideas on dialoguers is at odds with the core ideas of dialogue. Participation
in a dialogue which assumes some alien metaphysical principle can be awkward and
restrain people from engaging in dialogue. When such metaphysical entities are
presented as the goal of dialogue, the core philosophical principle of dialogue as a free
encounter between dialoguers, becomes endangered. Ethically, there is a risk that the
metaphysical entities are at odds with the personal worldviews of the dialoguers.
Pragmatically, the methods to facilitate dialogue become guided by the metaphysical
entities in favor of the needs, creativity and engagement of the dialoguers. Instead of
creating a strong personal experience and a new attitude towards discussed issues it runs
the risk of becoming a ritual predetermined by a metaphysical agenda.
It should be noted that dialoguers often express their personal experiences in
subjective terms, sometimes reflecting personal, sometimes cultural values. When a
group uses terms such as “magic” or “energy” to express their experiences, it should not
automatically be viewed in metaphysical terms. Actors, as well as dialoguers, often use
the world “energy” metaphorically or poetically to describe the level of co-operation. If
understood literally the experience of “energy” and talk of energy levels could easily be
dismissed as unscientific, but interpreted metaphorically, it can make perfect sense
(Collins 2004).

However, practitioners should not hide their personal views on metaphysical
questions if they are strongly committed to some. They should, however, make it clear
that the participants are free to draw their own metaphysical conclusions.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to contribute to a methodology for dialogue interventions.
Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention presents dialogue as one of many possible ways
humans engage in communication. Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention recognizes the
value of other language games in human systems and is not an effort to challenge these but is
an aid in designing dialogical intervention in situations where such are perceived to be
appropriate.

When participants learn to engage in dialogue, they learn a new way of relating that,
in itself, is more of an act than mere speech or contemplation of ideas. This ability is can be
used in any human encounter.

In a Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention the main focus of the participants
is the human system that is comprised out of the participants. Of course, participants in
dialogue bring with them their values, ideas and knowledge. However, a Systems
Sensitive Dialogue Intervention strives not to compare, transmit or evaluate these.
Instead, it focuses on what values, ideas and knowledge emerge from the dialogical
relation.

Systems Sensitive Dialogue Intervention encourages scientists, philosophers,
consultants and managers facilitating a dialogue to creatively combine content and
process focused methods with the human system that is engaging in dialogue as the
starting point.

The paper identifies the value of different dialogue-methods for dialogue
interventions. The notion of Systems Sensitive Dialogue Interventions was developed as
a result of empirical work with dialogue. It can be developed further by case studies of
dialogical interventions that are designed in accordance with the recommendations
presented here.

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On the Theory of Socratic Dialogue

Introduction

The German philosopher Leonard Nelson (1882 -1927), a follower of Kant’s ideas and a proponent of the Enlightenment, developed a method of teaching and learning to philosophise, which he called Socratic, and which later became known as Socratic Dialogue (SD). He used it as a pedagogic method in the seminars at the University of Goettingen, where he taught philosophy and mathematics. Subsequently he came to practise it with workers and other members of political organizations as well as at school. The tradition was taken on by his disciple Gustav Heckmann, professor in Hannover. nowadays a number of NGOs in some west European countries as well as all over the world are practicing it in a multitude of institutional settings. It is not an exaggeration to say that SD has become a widespread philosophical movement.

Here I am not going to compare Nelson’s version of SD with the original method of Socrates, or to fully reconstruct Nelson’s account of it. My task, as I see it for the purposes of our conference, is to present the current ways of practicing SD in educational (in the very broad sense of the word) contexts. I’ll try to define dialogue as a specific philosophical genre, and to show its basic aims and logic as I see them.

I became acquainted with SD about 6 years ago, and since then have attended several 3-days or shorter dialogues either as a participant or as an observer. without systematic training in the method, I ventured to use elements of it in my teaching at the university, e.g. answering the question “What is knowledge?”, and both the students and I feel that it has been a success. Another resource is a book in English containing essential materials on history and current practices in SD. It appeared in 2004 and is entitled Enquiring Minds. Socratic Dialogue in Education, edited by R. Saran and B. Neisser, published by Trentham Books. I find it invaluable for those who seek clear theoretical and practical instructions into the potentials of SD.

1. General description of the dialogue

We are speaking here of an oral form of communication between a number of people who are engaged in exploring a certain problem. Usually the main purpose of the dialogue is identified (and Nelson himself does so) as to let people acquire genuine philosophical experience. What exactly makes such a communication a dialogue, a philosophical one, and a Socratic one? And is the experience of philosophising to be regarded only as an end or as a goal in itself? The obvious answer, sanctioned by the millennia of philosophical activity, is “no”; therefore I’ll try to show what other – let’s call them sub-goals – of SD are being pursued by it.

1.1. “Dialogue”: in it a group of people (in SD - usually limited to 15, nearer 10 is preferable) interact via questions and answers in pursuit of a common goal. What makes this activity a dialogue is the exchange of thoughts on the basis of equal rights and obligations of the participants to follow the course of the thinking process, may be sometimes silently. The common goal converts the mere group of people into a community. The thought exchange creates a common space where people can meet. It is not a space occupied by a single person who confesses her own views on a given matter, nor a universal space from which everything can be seen clearly. Further on, the dialogue sets a common time - neither the biographical one of a single speaker, nor an eternal one in which universal truths dwell.

1.2. “Philosophy”: the nature of group activity in SD is talking as thinking. there are, however, different kinds of thinking. I find relevant to SD I’ll the distinction between contemplation and deliberation made by Aristotle. In Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, Ch. I, 1139a, he says:

Let us call one of these [parts of the soul] the scientific part, and the other the rationally calculating part; for deliberating is the same as rationally calculating and no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise.

(Similar statements can be found in EN 1111b26, 1112b15, 1177a17, 1177b1, Met. XII 7 1072b13-30).

In contemplation we seek knowledge about what is so and so, and cannot be otherwise, e.g. the laws of nature. In deliberation we think about what to do or not to do where things allow for change by human effort, e.g. where to go for dinner. Successful contemplation results in conclusion, successful deliberation – in decision. Contemplation is theoretical, deliberation – practical. Philosophical dialogue is a reflective practice that can be devoted either to contemplation or to deliberation, or to a certain combination of both. It is not just thinking about thinking, which is too abstract a definition of reflection; it is either deliberation of how we (do, must or must not) contemplate, or contemplation of how we (do, must or must not) deliberate.

1.3. “Socratic”: Socratic philosophical dialogue might be defined as contemplation of (past and finished) deliberations. It is contemplative thinking about deliberative thinking employed in some past practical situation, a deliberation that has led to a decision for a certain action. Through contemplation of the process of deliberation SD seeks to improve the latter, so that in some future situations it works better. This is practical wisdom which is impossible without theoretical one. SD is a unique liaison between theoretical and practical philosophy. Doing it, people think how to learn to think better, and in thinking how to learn, people learn how to think.

This is what makes the thinking in SD philosophical. thinking, however, is a process with content. The content of Socratic philosophical thinking is about what is guiding us in our everyday life. It is about our values, habits, preferences, customs and intuitions that structure our behaviour. We are dependent on our understanding of those values – of friendship, success, loyalty, freedom, etc.

Our understanding functions through shortcuts called concepts. Our value concepts are controversial by their very nature, and therefore they may be called truly philosophical. It is absurd to say that there is “the right notion of friendship” or “the true definition of the meaning of life”. Thus philosophy in SD depends both on method (thinking about thinking) and on content (thinking about value concepts).

So far, by specifying what is dialogical, Socratic and philosophical in SD, I have set some limits to the questions suitable for dealing with by the Socratic Method. A list of sample questions and topics is given in Appendix 2.

2. Diachronic Structure of SD – phases of the dialogue and the logic of the story

2.1. Setting the stage, time and rules. A SD is announced and a group of people gather to discuss a question that interests them, often because they have asked themselves that question previously concerning particular situations encountered in their past, and likely to happen again in the future. A person trained in guiding discussions is authorised to see that the story is being “written” according to the cannons of the genre and goes by and large in a “grammatically” correct way (here I mean grammar as the structure of the dialogue). The “grammatical” rules are being handed out either in advance or described at the beginning of the dialogue. Arrangements for report writing are made, parameters of meta-dialogue (see § 3.6. below) are introduced and examples told by participants are collected.

2.2. The question of interest is being explored on the basis of a particular example. The group or the facilitator chooses the example, applying certain criteria. The person who gave it becomes the example-giver (voluntarily) and makes a detailed description of the example helped by the questions and requests for particulars and clarifications by the other participants. The chosen example is being written up.

2.3. Participants analyse the example by questioning the reasons for the actions and attitudes of people in the example, by judging the discovered ones and/or by hypothesizing different reasons. Agreed reasons are further examined as instantiations of norms and values that underpinned the actions of people in the example. Participants determine points of agreement in the analysis. Those points are written up.

2.4. General questions, problems and principles are abstracted from the concrete example. This is what Nelson called regressive abstraction: going back from the contextually described particular situation to the reasons and principles behind it. Those reasons are supposedly grounded in norms and values, so the next step is to test the ethical validity of the latter on the basis of the former. Participants identify which abstractions they can agree with, and which remain as points of dissent. Shared views are being formulated and written up. This is how the story ends.

3. Synchronic structure – protagonist’s roles and the logic of enquiry.

3.1. Reliance on personal experience

SD theory claims that the personal experience of the participants plays a crucial role in the dialogue. It is essential for keeping the discussion close to the practical needs of the participants. But what is the practical need for philosophising? As Socrates himself saw it, philosophical еnquiry must dig under the surface of our everyday stereotypes of behaviour in order to reveal our ultimate goals in life, i.e. the values that guide us, and by an appeal to which we justify or excuse our actions. What do we call courage, prudence, justice, beauty? If all of us have their own peculiar and unique understanding of them, the life in a community would be impossible. So somewhere deep beneath the seeming differences must lie a common conception of those values. In order to discover it we must reflect on our personal experience and eliminate the things that obscure our view: social status, gender features, age, origin, language differences, and the like. The same attitude has been adopted by 20th century phenomenology, L. Nelson being one of the founders of one of its various types. In phenomenology we must turn to “the things themselves”, to their essence obscured by the influences of tradition, authorities of various kinds, theoretical commitments, cultural conventions, personal idiosyncrasies, etc. What remains after bracketing all these, is the pure phenomenon (hence phenomenology), and there is nothing beyond it – so it is also the essence, the eidos (the original, the model) of the thing we are studying. This clarifies further Nelson’s regressive abstraction – starting from the concrete and arriving at the universal. Precisely the universal was what Socrates sought to discover as common knowledge, i.e. the basis for shared values and collective activity.

So SD enquiry is looking for better understanding of our own commitments and their conceptual fundament.

Thus it might be said that the first sub-goal of SD is the discovery of norms and values at work in a certain community (thus using and fostering theoretical wisdom) [1].

3.2. Enquiring into the truth

The need for objectivity has always accompanied good philosophy; and what could be more objective than the truth? SD adopts a strong commitment to truth as one of the goals of inquiry. As yet, it might seem unclear what theory of truth underlies SD (see D. Krohn, Theory and practice of Socratic Dialogue, in: Enquiring Minds, pp. 21 -22). I would venture to say that different truth theories underlie the different stages of enquiry. Where a practical decision is to be made, the consensus theory plays a dominant role; where empirical facts are to be assessed, correspondence of statement and fact becomes crucial; and where speculation is needed in order to outline a vision about goals and outcomes, coherence and logical consistency comes to the fore. In so far as the final outcome of the SD is a judgement about values at work and their validity, the leading theory must be the consensus one.

Next, the question arises about what kind of truth is envisaged?

Nowadays we witness extreme relativism about truth, just to mention some post-modernistic views or the popular conception of Richard Rorty. Moreover, even contemporary science does not speak exclusively of objectivity and truth, but often of inter-subjective validity instead. It is not surprising that philosophy too has reconsidered and revised its demands for (especially absolute) truth, and proceeds from truths common to small communities, to more general ones accepted in a wider context. However, no universal truths are to be sought, if universal means context independent.

How intensively we seek the truth depends strongly on how deep is our desire to know it. When we put some question to the world, we outline a path that seems to lead somewhere, and supposedly we are willing to follow that path. So it is important for the question to be our own, to be of deep interest. In the tradition of SD the participants take a significant role in the choice of the dialogue topic. Looking backwards to Socrates, he sometimes elicits the question from the situation in which his interlocutor happens to be; sometimes the question is already “in the air” in one or other form. However, when the participants in SD have their own questions on the agenda, it is a kind of warrant that the discussion will not die out before the question is answered in a satisfactory way.

So the second sub-goal of SD is (passionately) tracking the truth in the above qualified sense (thus seeking theoretical wisdom) [2].

3.3. Interpersonal understanding and ethics of enquiry

The SD methodology is extremely suitable for team-building, because it aims at deeper and better interpersonal understanding. This is partly due to its theoretical background – the Nelsonian version of phenomenology: pure phenomena are supposedly universal for all people. However, there is another theory on the level of the synchronic structure that concerns the transfer of meaning in the dialogue.

Transfer of meaning is essential in any kind of communication, but the philosophical dialogue is a special case. It tries to approximate the ideal communicative situation. That is why so many philosophers in the past century have tried to specify its enabling conditions.

SD could be viewed as an exemplification of such a communicative situation, in which the so called “maxims” of communication, formulated by the Oxford philosopher H. P. Grice, are at work. They all fall under the constitutive principle of meaning exchange called the Cooperative principle. It states: Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. Each participant recognises in them a common purpose, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fairly definite (as in SD) or quite indefinite (as in everyday conversations). But at each stage some possible conversational moves would be excluded as unsuitable (H. P. Grice. Logic and Conversation, 1975. in: A. P. Martinich, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press 1996, p. 156.) The specific maxims are:

1. Quantity: make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange.

2. Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false or lacks adequate evidence.

3. Relation: Be relevant.

4. Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression and ambiguity. Be brief and orderly.

You may recognise in these maxims the rules of SD. they also imply that particular thinking skills are to be exercised in order to follow the maxims. reasoning in a community creates conditions for manifesting the variety of thinking skills available to the community as a whole. This is one of the major advantages of philosophical dialogue in general. Human beings exceed in intelligence all other species precisely by being able to use the resources of the whole community through language. When one participant uses skills for generalisation, another – of exemplification, a third – of tracing consequences, a fourth – of discovering hidden assumptions, all participants have the opportunity for trying to apply - by imitation and modeling – skills used by the others. Thus each participant is enabled to enrich their own repertoire of thinking skills. On the other hand, the group as a whole comes into possession of a wide variety of skills, so that very difficult questions can be handled with the thinking powers of the community. The so called synergic effect occurs.

Noteworthy, we have to differentiate between thinking in a community and groupthink. The latter is a mode of thought whereby individuals intentionally conform to what they perceive to be the consensus of the group. Groupthink may cause the group to make bad or irrational judgements (or decisions) which each member might individually consider to be unwise. Hence it is essential for SD to avoid groupthink, and this is ensured by the facilitator, the metadialogue, and the attentiveness of participants themselves.

The third sub-goal of SD might be identified as increasing the communicative intelligence of the participants as well as their thinking skills (thus fostering practical wisdom) [3].

3.4. Reaching consensus. Rule N 1 for facilitators (as well as phase 3 of SD) explicitly insists that consensus about norms and values is the ultimate outcome to be achieved. How strict is this requirement, and how is consensus to be understood in this context? For instance, consensus is a key concept in the philosophical school of pragmatism. There consensus is a truth criterion: for pragmatism the truth is what the whole community of researchers would accept in the long run, provided that the enquiry takes a long enough time. As Ch. S. Peirce says, the truth is the fate of a proposition; so we might say that consensus is the fate of the dialogue. However, contemporary notions of consensus are slightly different. One possible explication is this. consensus is a general agreement among the members of a given community, each of which exercises some discretion in judgement, decision making and follow-up action. Achieving consensus requires serious treatment of every stakeholder’s considered opinion. Consensus should involve collaboration rather than compromise. If consensus is being sought for in a purely instrumental way the result may be a simple trading—we'll sacrifice this if you'll sacrifice that. Genuine consensus typically requires more focus on developing the relationships among participants, so that they work together to achieve agreements based on willing consent. After all, it is possible in principle for everyone to agree but be mistaken.

In contemporary practice of SD, sometimes it is enough to achieve a greater clarification of the views that participants have about the matter at issue. Sometimes the outcome is just the outlining of different perspectives. And only sometimes merging of perspectives into one unified view is reached. In some institutional contexts it seems justified for SD to insist on reaching full consensus in order to justify SD’s practical applicability concerning ethical and political issues connected with decision making. in educational settings, however, SD often ends up without an explicit consensus, and this is to be theoretically assimilated, as in some recent publications (Rethinking Dialogue – Philosophy and Systems Intelligence, Sebastian Slotte, http://www.systemsintelligence.tkk.fi/slotte1.pdf).

The fourth sub-goal of SD is moving towards consensus (thus seeking practical wisdom) [4].

3.5. The role of the facilitator

The SD methodology adopts a content-neutral role of the facilitator. Especially in education, this is a very important strategy for fostering independent thinking. As Nelson contends, all the questions and answers are to come from the students (L. Nelson. The Socratic Method, in: Enquiring Minds, p. 142). the teacher is by all means an authority for the students, therefore in the classroom the danger of indoctrination is the greatest, if the teacher in the role of the facilitator allows herself to express her own views on the matter. The students take it to be the truth itself, and further inquiry becomes blocked.

The fifth sub-goal of SD is to foster thinking and deciding for oneself (thus seeking a union between theoretical and practical wisdom) [5].

3.6. Meta-dialogue

Meta-dialogue is the method for self-reflection of the dialogical community. It might be described as deliberation of how the contemplation is going and is to proceed further. In the meta-dialogue the rules of dialogue and matters of group dynamics are being discussed. Meta-dialogue may be started at any point of the dialogue in response to a request by any participant or by the facilitator, provided the need for it is well justified. My experience, very similarly to that of our German and English colleagues who are working in schools, shows that it might prove felicitous to start the lesson with a meta-dialogue in order “to clear up questions of organisation and problems of understanding” (R. Saran and B. Neisser, Socratic Dialogue in teaching ethics and philosophy: organisational issues. In: Enquiring Minds, p. 33).

Meta-dialogue is also a space for evaluation of the content dialogue. To my knowledge there is not a systematically developed framework for evaluation of SD. Some models are in use, however. They either distinguish evaluations by the participants, or assess the dialogue phases. The quality of analysis, participation, atmosphere, and the like are being mentioned in such evaluations.

the sixth sub-goal of SD is fostering philosophical wisdom, which distinguishes between practical and theoretical ones but is able to borrow from both in an appropriate way [6].

Conclusion

Philosophical experience acquired during SD is not only a matter of fascination prompted by a communicative situation different from many everyday strategic, manipulative and otherwise unsatisfactory dealings. It serves another clear-cut end of personal transformation: pushing forward the limits of freedom, independent thinking and self-enlightenment. Both facilitators and participants have the right to make use of SD to this end, and the responsibility to contribute to its achievement.